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CERCLA: TO CLEAN OR NOT TO CLEAN-THE SUPREME
COURT SAYS THERE IS NO QUESTION
U.S. v. Atl. Research Corp.
I. INTRODUCTION
Pollution takes many shapes and forms. From the air we breathe, to
the food we eat, to the water we drink to the soil below us, to the noise
around, pollution contributes to increased health problems and the
degradation of the environment. Since the publication of Rachel Carson's
environmental novel Silent Spring2 in 1962, heightened public awareness
of environmental problems prompted calls for proactive steps to improve
the quality of life by improving the quality of the environment.3 The
government, at all levels, responded to the demands through the
promulgation of regulations designed to reduce environmental pollution
levels. Passage and implementation of the Clean Air Act, 4 Clean Water
Act,5 and Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980,6 has furthered the development and enforcement of
regulations to protect the general public from exposure to hazardous
contaminants. In its recent decision, US. v. Atlantic Research Corp.,7 the
United States Supreme Court took elevated steps to ensure hazardous sites
are identified and cleaned in a timely, efficient manner by providing
responsible parties with the opportunity to recover costs incurred in the
voluntary clean-up of contaminated sites.8
' 127 S.Ct. 2331 (2007).
2 RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING, (Houghton Mifflin 1962).
3 See Jack Lewis, The Birth of the EPA, EPA Journal, Nov. 1985, available at
http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/epa/15c.htm ("EPA today may be said without
exaggeration to be the extended shadow of Rachel Carson. The influence of [Silent
Spring] has brought together over 14,000 scientists, lawyers, managers, and other
employees across the country to fight the good fight for 'environmental protection."').
4 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2000).
' 33 U.S.C § 1251 (2000).
642 U.S.C § 9601 (2000).
7 Atl. Research Corp., 127 S.Ct. 2331.
Id. at 2333-34.
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) contains two provisions in which private
parties can recoup costs for cleaning contaminated sites.9 Section 107(a)
allows for the recovery of costs incurred in site cleanup and section
1 13(f)(1) grants potentially responsible parties (PRP(s)) a right to
contribution from other liable parties.'o At the heart of this case is a
determination of whether, and under what provision, one PRP may recover
cleanup costs from another."
In U.S. v. Atl. Research Corp., Atlantic Research leased property at
a facility operated by the Department of Defense.12 Under contract with
9 Id.
1o 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607, 9613 (2000); Section 107(a), codified in 42 U.S.C. section 9607(a),
defines four categories of potentially responsible parties (PRPs) 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-
(4). It also makes them liable for "(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by
the United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the
national contingency plan;" and "(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by
any other person consistent with the national contingency plan." 42 U.S.C. §§
9607(a)(4)(A)-(B) (2000). Section 113(f)(1) is codified in 42 U.S.C. section 9613(f)(1)
and states in pertinent part: "Any person may seek contribution from any other person
who is liable or potentially liable under section 107(a) [42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)], during or
following any civil action under section 106 [42 U.S.C. § 9606] or under section 107(a)
[42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)]." 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2000).
" (11) U.S. v. Atl. Research Corp., 127 S.Ct. 2331, 2334 (2007). Section 107(a)(1)-(4)
lists four categories of persons as PRPs who are liable to other persons for assorted costs:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility; (2) any person who at the
time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at
which such hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) any person who by
contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged
with a transporter for transport for disposal of treatment, of hazardous
substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at
any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity
and containing such hazardous substances, and; (4) any person who accepts or
accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or treatment
facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person, from which there
is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response
costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable for [various costs].
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(l)-(4) (2000).
12 Atlantic, 127 S.Ct. at 2335.
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the United States, Atlantic Research retrofitted rocket motors by removing
propellant from the motors with pressurized water and burning the
waste.13 The resulting wastewater and burned fuel contaminated the soil
and groundwater on the leased property.14 Atlantic Research voluntarily
incurred site cleanup expenses, and subsequently sought to recover a
portion of its costs by suing the United States under both recovery
provisions.15 However, after the Supreme Court's decision in Cooper
Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., Atlantic Research amended its
complaint to seek damages solely under section 107(a).16
The United States moved to dismiss Atlantic Research's claim,
arguing section 107(a) does not allow Atlantic Research, a PRP in itself, a
cause of action to recover cleanup costs against another PRP.' The
District Court granted the motion and dismissed the case.' 8
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the District Court's
decision, reasoning section 1 13(f)(1) "does not provide 'the exclusive
route by which [PRPs] may recover cleanup costs."" 9 The Court held that
section 107(a)(4)(B) permitted suit by any person other than those
authorized under section 107(a)(4)(A) and consequently allowed Atlantic
Research a cause of action. On review, the United States Supreme
Court classified the term "other persons" under section 107(a)(4)(B) and





16 Id. In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., the Supreme Court held section
113(f)(1) authorized contribution claims only "during or following" a civil action under
42 U.S.C. section 9606 or 9607(a). Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543
U.S. 157 (2004). Because Atlantic was not previously or currently involved in litigation
under 42 U.S.C. sections 9606 or 9607(a), they would not have a contribution claim
under section 113(f)(1) following the Cooper decision. Id.
17 At. Research Corp., 127 S.Ct. at 2335.
8 Id. Atl. Research Corp. v. United States, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20484 (June 1, 2005).
19 Atl. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 834 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Consol.
Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. UGI Utils., Inc., 423 F.3d 90 (2nd Cir. 2005).20 Atl. Research Corp., 127 S.Ct. at 2335.
21 Id. at 2335-36.
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The United States argued the term "other persons" referred to
anyone not identified as a PRP in sections 107(a)(1)-(4) and that section
107(a)(4)(B) allowed suits only by non-PRPs, barring Atlantic Research's
claim.22 To the contrary, Atlantic Research argued section 107(a)(4)(B)
should be read in accordance with the immediately preceding
subparagraph.23 Under this interpretation, section 107(a)(4)(B) would
provide anyone other than the United States, a State, or an Indian tribe-
those parties specifically listed in section 107(a)(4)(A) - with a cause of
action against another PRP.24 Because Atlantic Research fit within the
classification of "other persons" as read in accordance with section
107(a)(4)(A), the Supreme Court held section 107(a) afforded PRPs - such
as Atlantic Research - a cause of action for the recovery of cleanup costs
against other PRPs.2 5
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
CERCLA is a federal law implemented with the objective to
promote the cleanup of sites contaminated with hazardous pollutants26
whose goals include shifting cleanup costs to parties responsible for
"creating or maintaining the hazardous condition" and "encouraging the
timely clean-up of hazardous waste sites." 27 CERCLA authorizes the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to promulgate a National
Contingency Plan that outlines the precise steps that parties must take
when cleaning a hazardous waste site. 28 Additionally, the EPA may
obtain an injunction or administrative compliance order directing
responsible parties to respond to the contamination of sites deemed
22 id
23 id
24 Id. at 2336.
2 Id. at 2339.
26 Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., 423 F.3d 90 (2nd Cir.
2005).
27 Id. at 94 (citing Control Data Corp. v. S.C.S.C. Corp., 53 F.3d 930, 935-36 (8th Cir.
1995)).
28 Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Chicago v. N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc.,
473 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2007).
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imminent threats. 29 Finally, the EPA may initiate cleanup on its own
using monies from the "Hazardous Substances Superfund," which was
established by CERCLA and funded through appropriations, fees, and
taxes.30
To facilitate timely cleanup of contaminated sites, CERCLA
encourages parties to voluntarily "pursue appropriate environmental
response actions." 3' Accordingly, the law contains three provisions in
which liable parties may be reimbursed for their efforts from other like-
situated parties: (1) Section 107(a) allows for the recovery of cleanup and
prevention costs; 32 (2) Section 1 13(f)(1) creates a contribution right for
parties liable or potentially liable under CERCLA sections 107(a)(1)-(4);3
and (3) Section 1 13(f)(3)(B) creates a contribution right for parties that
have resolved their liability by settlement. 34 Sections 107(a) and 113(f)(1)
constitute the focus of the instant decision.
A. Statutory Background and Application
Section 107(a) imposes liability on various parties for "all costs of
removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government or a
State ... not inconsistent with the national contingency plan."35 The EPA
regularly brings suit under section 107(a) to recover costs incurred
restoring the polluted area and preventing future contamination. 36 Actions
instituted under section 107(a) hold responsible parties strictly, jointly,
and severally liable which allows for cost recovery in full from any
responsible party, regardless of their comparative fault. 37 Additionally,
section 107(a) allows private parties to pursue such actions for "cost
29 d30 id.
31 Consolidated, 423 F.3d at 94 (citing H.R. REP. No. 96-1016(I), at 17 (1980), reprinted
in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120).
32 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006).
1 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (2006).
34 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(3)(B).
3 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (2006).
36 Consolidated, 423 F.3d at 94. See, e.g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 999
(2nd Cir. 1991).
3 7 Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Chi. v. N Am. Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc., 473
F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2007).
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recovery"38 by holding responsible parties liable for "any other necessary
costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national
contingency plan." 39
As drafted in 1980, CERCLA failed to include an express
provision granting parties against whom liability had been or could be
imposed (PRPs)4 a means for recovering cleanup costs from fellow PRPs.
Notwithstanding the absence of specific language granting a right to
contribution, certain courts held that as a matter of common law section
107(a) provided PRPs a right to sue other parties to recover voluntarily
incurred response costs. 4 1 Courts began to split on this issue in 1986
when Congress amended CERCLA with the Superfund Amendment and
Reauthorization Act (SARA) 42 and enacted section 113(f)(1), which
created an expressed contribution right for parties liable or potentially
liable under CERCLA.43
Section 113(f)(1) states "any person may seek contribution from
any other person who is liable or potentially liable under section 107(a)
during or following any civil action under section 106 or under section
107(a)."44 Following the implementation of section 113(f)(1), certain
courts concluded PRPs capable of being sued under section 107(a) could
not subsequently seek reimbursement from other potentially responsible
18 Consolidated, 423 F.3d at 94.
" 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (2006) (emphasis added). See also Key Tronic Corp. v.
United States, 511 U.S. 809,818 (1994) (noting that § 107(a) "unquestionably provides a
cause of action for private parties to seek recovery of cleanup costs").
40 Consolidated, 423 F.3d at 97.
41 Consolidated, 423 F.3d at 95; see Sand Springs Home v. Interplastic Corp., 670
F.Supp. 913, 916-917 (N.D. Okla. 1987) (holding that a CERCLA contribution right
existed as a matter of federal common law); United States v. New Castle County, 642
F.Supp. 1258, 1262-69 (D. Del. 1986); United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619
F.Supp. 162, 227-29 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (holding that a CERCLA contribution right was
implied in the statute's language).
42 Jeannette Paull, Neither Innocent Nor Proven Guilty: The Aviall Services v. Cooper
Industries Dilemma, 13 BUFF. ENVT'L L.J. 31 (2005); see generally Act to Extend and
Amend the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613
(2005).
43 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2006).
44 Id.
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parties under the same provision.45 Rather, the claims were "necessarily
actions for contribution, and [were] therefore governed by the mechanisms
set forth in section 113(f)."46 In addition, SARA added section
11 3(f)(2) 47 which encourages parties to "settle with the government by
insulating any party that settles from being sued in a contribution
action."4
B. Summary ofRelevant Case Law
In 2004, the United States Supreme Court provided further confusion in its
interpretation of section 113(f)(1) with the decision of Cooper Indus., Inc.
v. Aviall Serv., Inc.4 9 In Cooper, a purchaser discovered that he and the
prior owner contaminated their property when hazardous substances
leaked into the ground.50 Despite notifying appropriate federal and state
officials about the contamination, neither party took judicial measures
compelling the purchaser to clean the area.5 1 The purchaser thereafter
engaged in voluntary cleanup and subsequently sought contribution from
the previous owner under section 113(f)(l ).52 The Court reversed the
decision of the Fifth Circuit that allowed the purchaser relief under section
113(f)(1), holding the language of section 113(f)(1) allowed contribution
claims only "during or following" a civil action under sections 106 or
107(a). Because the purchaser was never subject to action under sections
106 or 107(a), he was not authorized to seek contribution under section
45 Consolidated, 423 F.3d at 95; see Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118
F.3d 1298, 1302 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[W]hile § 107 created the right of contribution, the
'machinery' of § 113 governs and regulates such actions, providing the details and
explicit recognition that were missing from the text of § 107.").
46 Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153 F.3d 344, 350 (6th Cir.
1998).
47 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (2000).
48 Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Chi. v. N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc., 473
F.3d 824, 828. (7th Cir. 2007).
49 Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
'
0 Id. at 163-64.
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113(f)(1). 54 Additionally, the Court declined to address the issue of
whether the purchaser, a fellow PRP, could recover costs under section
107(a) as it was not raised or considered in the lower courts.55
Cooper held that a PRP could only bring a contribution claim
under section 113(f)(1) during or following a civil action under sections
106 or 107(a) 56 . However, Cooper failed to establish if, and under what
provision, a PRP who is not the subject of a civil action under sections 106
or 107(a) may recover voluntary cleanup costs from a fellow PRP.
Subsequently, circuits were split on how to treat PRPs seeking to recover
voluntarily incurred cleanup costs.
In Consolidated Edison Co. ofN.Y, Inc. v. UGI Utilities, Inc., the
Second Circuit held that PRPs may bring an action under section 107(a)
for response costs incurred voluntarily.57 Consolidated Edison sought
reimbursement from the operator of one of its power plants for cleanup
costs it incurred in cleaning hazardous waste. 8 The complaint sought
damages under both section 107(a) and section 1 13(f)(1). Based on the
Cooper decision, the court rejected the claim under section 113(f)(1) as
Coisolidated Edison was not and had not been the subject of litigation
under either section 106 or section 107(a). * Instead, the court concluded
that section 107(a) authorizes PRPs a suit to recover voluntary response
costs.60
Recently, in Metro Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago v.
N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc. the Seventh Circuit allowed PRPs a
61
right of action under section 107(a). Metropolitan Waters leased a large
parcel of land to Lake River Co Toration, a subsidiary of North American
Galvanizing and Coatings, Inc.. Lake River developed the property by
constructing a business to store, mix, and package industrial chemicals for
54 id
56 id




0 Id at 100.
61 473 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 2007).
62 id. at 825.
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personal and commercial use. 63 The business involved the acceptance of
large amounts of chemicals that were stored on the property in large,
above-ground containers which eventually leaked over 12,000 gallons of
chemicals into the soil and groundwater. 4 The industrial chemicals were
deemed "hazardous substances" by CERCLA standards and posed
"imminent danger" to the environment.65 Metropolitan Waters voluntarily
cleaned the area and subsequently sought to recover costs from Lake River
Corporation and North American under section 107(a) and section
113(f)(1). 66 The Seventh Circuit held that PRPs who voluntarily
undertake cleanup actions have an implied right to contribution under
section 107(a) from other responsible parties.67
Contrary to Second and Seventh Circuit holdings, the Third Circuit
reached a different conclusion in E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. v. United
68States. In E.I. Dupont, the company owned property which was "owned
or operated by the United States at various times during World War I,
World War II, and/or the Korean War, during that time the United States
was responsible for some contamination." 6 9 The company voluntarily
incurred cleanup costs in absence of a section 106 or section 107(a) action
and thereafter sought contribution from the United States. 70 The District
Court and Third Circuit rejected the company's claim. The Third Circuit
determined it was bound by precedent and held that "a PRP seeking to
offset its cleanup costs must invoke contribution under section 113 .. . .1
The court reasoned that under CERCLA, "Congress intended to allow
contribution for settling or sued PRPs as a way to encourage them to admit
their liability, settle with the Government, and begin expeditious cleanup
operations pursuant to a consent decree or other agreement." 72
63 d
6 Id.
6 1 Id. at 825.
66 id67 id.
68 460 F.3d 515, 547-548 (3d Cir. 2006).
69 Id. at 525.70 id.
71 Id. at 528.
72 Id. at 541.
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IV. INSTANT DECISION
In the instant case, the Supreme Court determined "the parties'
dispute centers on what 'other persons' may sue under section
107(a)(4)(B)."7  Applying rules of statutory interpretation and reviewing
the statute as a whole, the Court determined "[I]t is natural to read the
phrase 'any other person' by referring to the immediately preceding
section 107(a)(4)(A) which permits suits only by the United States, a
State, or an Indian Tribe. 74 The phrase 'any other person' therefore means
any person other than those three."75 Accordingly, the Court determined
"the plain language of [section 107(a)(4)(B)] authorizes cost-recovery
actions by any private party, including PRPs."76
Further, the Court noted that if they were to accept the
Government's argument that section 107(a)(4)(B) provides relief for
innocent parties, specifically excluding those described in section
107(a)(l)-(4), section 107(a)(4)(B) would be rendered moot as nearly all
parties involved in the ownership or use of the land fall within the purview
of these sections.77 Under the Government's approach, the Court noted, it
is unclear who would classify for relief under section 107(a)(4)(B),
rendering it "a dead letter."7  The Court rejected the Government's theory
noting "[w]e must have regard to all words used by Congress, and as far as
possible give effect to them." 79
The Government also argued the Court's reading of section 107(a)
will cause friction between sections 107(a) and 113(f)(1) by allowing
PRPs a choice between the two provisions. The Government claimed
" At. Research Corp., 127 S.Ct. at 2335.
74 Id. at 2336.
75 id.
76id
n Id at 2236-37
78Id. at 2337.
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parties will choose section 107(a) over section 1 13(f)(1) in order to evade
section 1 13(f)(1)'s more restrictive statute of limitations, to seek joint and
several liability under section 107(a) rather than equitable distribution
under section 1 13(f)(1), and to disregard the settlement bar set forth in
section 113(f)(2). 8 1 The Court rejected each contention in turn. 82
The Court began by reviewing the procedural differences between
sections 107(a) and 113(f)(1) . "Section 113(f)(1) authorizes a
contribution action to PRPs with common liability stemming from an
action instituted under section 106 or section 107(a). And section 107(a)
permits cost recovery by a private party that has itself incurred clean-up
costs." 83 Procedurally, a PRP who seeks recovery under section 113(f)(1)
has already incurred costs as a result of its liability and now seeks to
recoup from other liable parties. 84 Because the PRPs were reimbursing
cleanup costs already paid, they did not incur their own personal costs and
were therefore ineligible for recovery under section 107(a). 5 In contrast,
recovery under section 107(a) arises when parties voluntarily incur
cleanup costs and then seek financial assistance from liable parties.86
Parties eligible under section 107(a) have not been the subject of
government action under sections 106 or 107.
The Court found that the provisions provide for recovery in two
distinct situations, therefore eliminating the scenario one may choose
section 107(a) over section 1 13(f)(1) for the less restrictive statute of
limitations period.8 8 For the same procedural reasons, the Court also
rejected the Government's contention that PRPs could avoid the equitable
81 Id. at 2337; the settlement bar refers to section 11 3(f)(2) which provides "[a] person
who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State in an administrative or
judicially approved settlement shall not be liable for claims for contribution regarding
matters addressed in the settlement." 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (2000). The Government
contends recovery under both sections 107(a) and 113(f)(1) will result in fewer
settlements for fear of recovery under both a settlement agreement and section 107(a).
Ad. Research Corp., 127 S.Ct. 2331, 2337.
82 Atl Research Corp., 127 S.Ct. 2331, 2337.
1 Id. at 2338.
4 Id.
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apportionment of costs under section 113(f)(1) for joint and several
liability under section 107(a). 89 Additionally, the Court noted that "the
choice of remedies simply does not exist."90 Regardless, a defendant PRP
under a section 107(a) claim could avoid an inequitable distribution of
costs by filing a section 113(f)(1) counterclaim. 9 In doing such, "the
court may allocate response costs among liable parties using such
equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate." 92
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that allowing PRPs to
recover under section 107(a) will result in a disregard for the
settlement provisions provided in section 113(f)(2). 93 First, the Court
noted that section 113(f)(2) only prohibits contribution claims against "[a]
person who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State in an
administrative or judicially approved settlement .... "94 The United States
argued that the provision does not protect against liability under section
107(a) making parties hesitant to enter into settlement agreements for fear
they will be held additionally liable under section 107(a). 95 However, the
Court doubted the provision would discourage settlement as defendant
PRPs can still file section 113(f)(1) counterclaims for equitable
apportionment. 96 Further, the Court stated "applying traditional rules of
equity would undoubtedly consider any prior settlement as part of the
liability calculus." 97
Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of
Appeals and held "[b]ecause the plain terms of section 107(a)(4)(B) allow
a PRP to recover costs from other PRPs, the statute provides Atlantic
Research with a cause of action."98
9 Id. at 2338-39.
90 Id at 2339.
91 Id.
92 d
9 Id.; section 113(f)(2) is codified in 42 U.S.C. sec. 3613(f)(2) (2000).
94 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) (2006).
9 Id. at 2339.
96 id
97 At. Research Corp., 127 S.Ct. 2331, 2338 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
886A(2) (1977) ("No tortfeasor can be required to make contribution beyond his own
equitable share of the liability."))
Id. at 2339.
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V. COMMENT
Through the application of basic statutory interpretation, the
United States Supreme Court reached a decision in Atlantic that single-
handedly serves to promote the dual aims of CERCLA-encouraging the
voluntary clean-up of contaminated sites and holding polluters liable for
their actions. 99 By allowing PRPs who voluntarily incur cleanup costs a
cause of action under section 107(a), the Court eased fears of a chilling
effect on voluntary cleanup under Cooper and furthered long-term benefits
to the environment.' 00
Following the Cooper decision, proponents of voluntary cleanup
worried PRPs would refuse to undertake voluntary remediation for fear
they would not recover response costs from other contributing, liable
parties.' 0' PRPs were forced to weigh the benefits of voluntary cleanup
with the concern against the possibility of recovering costs.102 This
analysis included consideration of "[t]he relative speed and cost-
effectiveness of a voluntary cleanup.. .balanced against the risk that costs
will not be recoverable. These risks must be further balanced against the
risk of inviting enforcement from state environmental officials."' 03
Parties choosing to forego voluntary cleanup to await government action
allowed contaminated sites to deteriorate further and response costs to
escalate.104 By providing a cause of action for non-innocent parties under
section 107, Atlantic Research encourages swift and voluntary cleanups
9 H.R. REP. No. 96-1016 (1980).
100 Jeannette Paull, Neither Innocent Nor Proven Guilty: The Aviall Services v. Cooper
Industries Dilemma, 13 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 31, 56-57 (2005) (stating "[a] second theory is
that the [Aviall] decision will have a chilling effect on voluntary cleanup because parties
will fear the inability to recover their response costs.").
101 Brief of Respondent at 26-27, Cooper Indus. V. Aviall Services, 125 S.Ct. 577 (2004)
(No. 02-1192) 2004 WL 768554.
102 d
103 Robert Longstreth, Supreme Court Decision Imperils Voluntary Environmental
Cleanups, Mondaq Business Briefing, Mar. 4, 2005 WLNR 3312112.
i0 JEANNETTE PAULL, NEITHER INNOCENT NOR PROVEN GUILTY: THE A VIALL SERVICES V.
COOPER INDUSTRIES DILEMMA, 13 BUFF. ENVT'L. L.J. 31, 57 (2005).
465
Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 15, No. 2
whereo arties may recover equitable costs regardless of their status as a
PP.
In addition to encouraging timely and efficient cleanup of
hazardous sites, claims under section 107 may lessen the EPA's
administrative and financial burdens by reducing the number of sites on
the National Priorities List (NPL). 0 6 The NPL was created by the EPA to
ensure that the sites most threatening "human health and the environment"
were cleaned before response costs escalated and the environment faced
further degradation. 0 7 Despite the goal of ensuring the most dangerous
sites get priority treatment, "the average time between the first listing of a
site on the NPL and completion of the site's remedy is twelve years."' 0 8
The more time a site spends on the NPL, the more damage is caused to the
environment, and the more expensive it is to remedy such damage. By
allowing PRPs an opportunity to recover funds incurred in the voluntary
cleanup of contaminated sites, PRPs are more likely to proactively clean
contaminated areas instead of waiting for the government to discover the
site, place it on the NPL, and expend government money to remedy
damage.
Moreover, an increase in the number of voluntary cleanups will
maintain the dwindling Superfund balance, from which the government
funds its settlements, and reallocate money to other sites with less
available means for remediatiOD.109 Before Atlantic, barring PRPs from
recovery resulted in a significant apportionment of Superfund monies to
those PRPs who awaited government discovery of the pollution before
initiating cleanup. 11 Often these parties entered into "mixed funding"
agreements whereby they would share a portion of the cleanup costs with
the government.'1  These agreements allowed the EPA to
"reimburse.. .parties to the agreement from the [Super]Fund, with interest,
1os Id.
o' Id. at 58.
107 id.
108 KATHERINE N. PROBST, ET. AL, FOOTING THE BILL FOR SUPERFUND CLEANUPS: WHO
PAYS AND How? 18 (The Brookings Institution 1995).
10 Jeannette Paull, Neither Innocent Nor Proven Guilty: The Aviall Services v. Cooper
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for certain costs of actions under the agreement that the parties have
agreed to perform but which the [EPA] has agreed to finance."ll 2 While
the EPA retains the ability to recover costs from other liable parties under
section 107(a), 113 this is little solace when the responsible parties are
insolvent and response costs are elevated because contamination is not
treated until discovered by the government. The Court's interpretation
prevents the United States from footing the bill for all settlement
agreements.
Additionally, the Court's decision contributes to the fiscal health of
the PRPs and the Government by preventing all involved parties from
rushing into settlement agreements with the EPA to ensure a contribution
claim under section 113(f)(1)." 4 Prohibiting claims under section 107(a)
allows parties only one means of recovering cleanup costs-through
contribution claims under section 113(f)(1). Rather than go through
expensive litigation with the United States, it is often in a party's best
interest to enter into a settlement that would likely result in a mixed-
funding agreement"' 5 and provide the PRP with a contribution claim under
section 1 13(f)(1). If parties were not allowed a claim under section
107(a), the EPA would be inundated with new claims to process and the
Superfund, from which the government funds its settlements, would be
further drained from an increase in the number of settlement
agreements.116 By allowing claims under section 107(a), parties are more
likely to clean the contaminated area first, and then seek contribution from
other liable parties rather than settling with the Government, cleaning the
contaminated area, and then seeking contribution.
Opponents argue that allowing claims by fellow PRPs under
section 107(a) will result in "disproportionate liability" as a PRP that has
not been sued under section 106 or section 107(a) may have an incentive
to avoid settlement with the government and seek more generous remedies
112 42 U.S.C. § 9622(b)(1) (2000).
1 13 id.
114 JEANNETE PAULL, NEITHER INNOCENT NOR PROVEN GUILTY: THEAVIALL SERVICES V.
CooPER INDUSTRIES DILEMMA, 13 BUFF. ENvT'L. L.J. 31, 56-57 (2005) (stating "[o]ne
theory is that the [Aviall] decision will cause a rush on EPA to enter into settlement
agreements so that parties will be able to use § 113.").
"' Id. at 59.
11 Id. at 56.
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under section 107(a)." 7 The fallacy in this argument is that section 107(a)
and section 1 13(f)(1) provide recovery for two distinct situations.
First, section 113(f)(1) grants PRPs a right to contribution which is
defined as the "tortfeasor's right to collect from others responsible for the
same tort after the tortfeasor has paid more than his or her proportionate
share, the shares being determined as a percentage of fault."" Applying
this definition of contribution, "a PRP's right to contribution under section
113(f)(1) is contingent upon an inequitable distribution of common
liability among liable parties."ll 9 To the contrary, section 107(a) does not
create a right to contribution but rather permits recovery of cleanup
costs.120 A PRP may recover the costs it incurred in cleaning up a site
without establishing liability to another party which is required under a
contribution claim.121 Secondly, the "remedies available in sections
107(a) and 11 3(f)(1) complement each other by providing causes of action
'to persons in different procedural circumstances."' 122 Finally, even if a
PRP were to choose the more generous liability under section 107(a), a
defending PRP could prevent an inequitable distribution of costs by filing
a section 113 (f)(1) counterclaim and seeking contribution costs from the
PR-P.123
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Atlantic put an end to the
ambiguity and confusion faced when interpreting sections 107(a) and
113(f)(1) of CERCLA. While it is too soon to feel the effects of the
Court's decision, it will further the dual purpose of CERCLA by
encouraging the voluntary clean-up of contaminated sites while holding
1 Brief for the United States at 37, United States v. Atl. Research Corp., No. 06-562
(U.S. March 1, 2007).
118 Atlantic, 127 S.Ct. 2331, 2337-38 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 353 (8th Ed.
1999)).
"
9 Id. at 2338.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 2338 (citing Consolidated Edison, 423 F.3d at 99).
123 Id. at 2339.
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polluters liable for their actions.1 24 Additionally, by providing a remedy
for those who voluntarily comply with state and federal regulations,
actions under section 107 have the potential to eliminate the adverse
effects from delayed discovery of contaminated sites. Finally, an increase
in the number of voluntary clean-ups opens government funds for use on
other hazardous areas. Continued developments in environmental law,
such as those found in Atlantic, can only help improve the quality of the
air we breathe, the food we eat, the water we drink, the soil below us, and
the sounds around us.
Claire McClintic
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